Military history pages.

Building an Army

THE ROMANTIC RISE OF A TERRITORIAL FORCE

By Frederic W. Walker

III

How It Affects Us.

The rôle of the Territorial Force in war is that of frustrating an invasion or defeating a force if it secures a landing. Thus on the Army Reserve being called out it would be embodied for six months. In the military districts envelopes are kept ready to despatch by post to the men, when they would assemble at their drill halls and await orders. At the same time a war staff would be given them. Whether or not we can be invaded is a question which is hotly debated for and against, but the mere existence of a Territorial Force to use against such an appalling possibility is, after all, the best answer to the question.

For centuries the Navy has ensured the safety of these islands and a continued peace is historically associated with militant degeneracy. But while we have been immune from invasion the British Navy maintained itself on the coastline of its enemies and covered raids innumerable by military forces. This has been possible owing to the possession of dominating naval power, and it is an argument in favour of the chance of the scales being turned upon us whenever an enemy or combination of foes enters the field with naval strength sufficient to give us battle. In a few years the margin of the balance of power in the North Sea will be much smaller than it now is; great navies are also arising all over the world, particularly in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. It is for us to look ahead and realise possible danger.

Foreign powers, gauging in the customary academic sense the chances of landing a sea-borne force, take into account certain moral factors which tend to enhance their opportunities towards the development of a scheme of invasion. These are as follows: -

  1. The loss of command of the sea to which Britain has been accustomed for generations would, even if only temporary, cause panic here; and the landing of an invading force, which had nearly always been thought impossible, would cause national demoralisation for a time.
  2. The British troops available would be the non-regular forces, who in their present condition are as yet unprepared for serious warfare.
  3. The invading force would therefore strike at some vital part before Britain could concentrate here county troops, and before she could recover from the stupefaction which her position would necessarily entail, but which would not be of long duration owing to the fine national characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon people for facing and overcoming difficulties.
  4. Whilst this blow was being struck at a disconcerted populace attempt would be made by large forces to influence the situation in Britain by a victory abroad, which, if sustained would prolong the operations at home.

The moment the telegraph ticked out the news of a landing the whole Territorial fabric of home defence would be put in motion, and if it proved to have been neglected utter confusion would ensue of a magnitude impossible to a field army abroad. Our initial work would be the massing by rail and road on a broad line of 40,000 men from the midlands, 20,000 from Essex, 10,000 from Surrey, 20,000 from Middlesex and 20,000 from London.

If an enemy landed on the Norfolk coast, the objective of the invaders would be to seize the telegraphs of the Great Eastern and Great Northern railways with cavalry or cyclists, and drive a wedge between the northern and southern home forces to prevent them uniting. The natural obstacles to be met with on a line of march in accomplishing this consist of waterways and marshes of no considerable moment, and a vigorous offensive would be developed if possible before the Territorial Army could be concentrated.

The further objective would be the isolation not only of the north, but of the west by inward menace and feints at other landings. A force to besiege London would, covered in rear, ultimately guarded in the west, and with the left flank resting safely on the seacoast, move against such portion of our home army as might be assembled as a covering force round London. It is possible the 60,000 men would move south against the capital, another 40,000 being used as a holding force in the north midlands and in the west.

The troops available to meet an enemy would, if all Regulars were abroad, be the fourteen Territorial Divisions, of whom five or six, say 110,000 men, would be immediately available for operation against the enemy's main advance on London. The home command would, when his forces united, probably attempt to "draw" the enemy until the latter's line of communication became long and weak; he would probably threaten the enemy's western flank in order to make him advance with his force concentrated. The defenders might then fall back upon a prepared position outside London and give battle. This is the course of action which commends itself to one of our foremost soldiers at the probable trend of events, and it indicates that Home Defence should be a specialised training.

Let the Territorial Force therefore be taken from inland standing camps and be practised in on the Suffolk flats, the hedge-country of Essex, the close fields of Bucks, and on the natural positions, such as the Chilterns, the Fens, the Lea and the New River, the South Downs, and other places where they may gain a local knowledge of terrain such as the Boers possessed and which gave them many victories. With this training, and secure in full numbers and with moden scientific equipment, Great Britain could make invasion so hazardous that none would attempt it. This strength is not with us yet, but the nation is face to face with the problem and must find a solution.

Perhaps one of the most convincing arguments why we should have a strong home army - Lord Roberts says our total force should be a million men - is to be found in the enormous growth of foreign armies, any one of whom could afford to throw 300,000 men away at a venture of invasion.

As a consequence, many professional military men contend that we, as a nation, will eventually have to adopt compulsory military service, or conscription. This idea is also favoured by a large number of civilians, but the leaders of both political parties in the House of Commons believe that the English people as a nation love their liberty too well ever to accept any military exacted from them by compulsion, and hence we are witnessing the present attempt to organise the Yeomanry and Volunteers into an army in the full, proper, and complete sense of the word.

This really agreed to be final effort to obtain voluntary means a Home Defence Force capable of resisting invasion or raid. To show the serious nature of the problem, however, I append the statistics of foreign armies in comparison with our own, the total of all forces being taken:-

1800  1854

 To-day
Gt. Britain  240,000 535,000 700,000
France 260,000 580,000 3,900,000
Austria 280,000 530,000 2,500,000
Russia 433,000 1,277,000 4,500,000
Germany 220,000 399,000 4,300,000

"Defence, not Defiance." To be strong is to be respected

The Author.

Mr. F. W. Walker, the writer of this article, possesses an interesting personality. Born at Elswick, where the guns come from, he was originally intended for the Army, but he took to newspaper work instead, and for twenty years past he has utilised many newspaper connections to interest the public in the Army and to draw both the civilian and the soldier more closely together. A famous Field-Marshal at the War Office has written of him: "Mr. Walker has attended every drill season since 1890 - day and night - and I feel that he knows more about the Army than any living civilian"

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